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Role of the Middle Eastern Sovereign Wealth Funds in the current
global financial crisis.
1.0 Introduction:
The purpose of this paper is to examine the nature and the role of the Sovereign
Wealth Funds (SWFs) in the context of the current global financial crisis which had its
origins in the U. S. Subprime crisis that ensued in late 2007.
Our particular focus will be on exploring whether the investment activities of
these SWFs in general and those of Middle Eastern countries in particular were
conducive or inimical to financial stability. Also, what are some of the other important
implications of the investments of these funds in terms of asset prices, exchange rate
movements and emerging new international financial architecture?
The focus of the analysis is the recent global (‘Subprime’) financial crisis, so the
scope of the analysis is purposefully kept within narrower bounds. Just as an incidental
observation, there is a significant and growing interest amongst academicians and policy-
makers alike in studying the various aspects of these SWFs ranging from such issues as
impact of SWFs on global financial markets (Beck and Fidora 2008) to a greater need for
‘transparency’ and ‘accountability’ of these newly important vehicles of global finance
(Truman 2008).
The rest of this paper is organized as follows:
Section 2.0 describes the nature of the Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs) followed by
section 3.0 on “Stylized Statistical Facts about SWFs”. The next section presents a brief
analysis of the primary causes of the ‘Subprime Crisis’. Section 5.0 analyzes the role of
SWFs in the current global financial crisis and, finally, Section 6.0 presents “Concluding
Remarks”.
2.0 What are Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs)?
Even though there is no universally agreed upon definition of a SWF, the
following is a fairly comprehensive one offered by the International Monetary Fund (IMF
“Work Agenda” to study SWFs, February 2008) which defines SWFs as
“...special purpose public investment funds…that are owned or controlled by the
government, and hold, manage or administer assets primarily for medium- to long-term
macroeconomic and financial objectives. The funds are commonly established out of
official foreign currency operation, the proceeds of privatizations, fiscal surpluses and/or
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receipts resulting from commodity exports. The funds employ a set of investment
strategies which include investments in foreign financial assets”.
Besides being typically state-owned, generally, a SWF also has no explicit
liabilities; it has a relatively long investment horizon, high risk tolerance and a high
degree of foreign currency exposure. Also, such a fund is managed separately from
official exchange reserves. (Jen 2007). There are apparently a few close cousins of SWFs
as well such as Sovereign Pension Funds; however, the latter tend to have explicit
liabilities.
SWFs may be set up for purposes of revenue stabilization, maximizing risk-
adjusted returns, intergenerational national consumption smoothing for resource-
dependent economies, diversification from single revenue source. (Moshirian 2008). In
this paper, we will consider a SWF to be primarily interested in foreign investments, with
a long term investment horizon and high risk tolerance.
Again, it is useful to categorize world wide SWFs into two groups characterized
by their sources of funds—so-called “Commodity” and “Non-commodity” SWFs. The
former draw their funds from resource based (e.g. oil) current account surpluses while the
latter draws their respective funds from non-resource current account surplus based on
exports of manufactured goods and services often operating under a managed foreign
exchange rate regime requiring currency market interventions. The Middle Eastern SWFs
typically belong to the former group while the East Asian SWFs are representatives of the
latter type.
Even though SWFs have been around since at least 1953 (e.g. Kuwait Investment
Authority), it is only in the last few years that they have garnered extraordinary attention.
They have enjoyed exponential growth in assets on account of commodity boom and
export generated current account surpluses for many of the East Asian countries. The
SWFs role as potential ‘rescuers’ of several financial institutions during the early phase
of the subprime crisis has really brought them much recent attention. In any event, these
funds have enjoyed an exceptional period of growth. As noted by a recent position paper
by the Swiss Bankers Association (May 2008), SWFs currently have a worldwide
investment volume of more that $ 3 trillion and the assets managed by such SWFs could
reach $ 7 trillion by 2012 and $ 10-15 trillion by 2015.
In the following section, I will present a few stylized facts about SWFs to sharpen
our perception of them.
3.0 Stylized Statistical Facts about SWFs.
Figure 1 presents estimates of Official Exchange Reserves as well as the
corresponding SWFs of various countries as of 2008. Note that a country like UAE, with
a long tradition of funding a SWF, has a proportionately modest Official Foreign
Exchange Reserves. However, unlike UAE, China which is a relatively new entrant in
this field has an 8:1 ratio of its Official Foreign Exchange Reserves ($ 1.5 trillion) to its
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SWF ($ 0.2 trillion). In the future, one can expect China (and Russia) will fund their
SWFs relatively more using their vast Foreign Exchange Reserves. This has obviously
very important implications for the world-wide growth of SWFs and global rebalancing
of investment flows between U. S. Treasuries vs. more risky equities.
Figure 1: Estimated Official Exchange Reserves and SWFs of various countries (2008)
The following Table 1 presents a summary of the largest SWFs in terms of
their relative asset size and proclivity towards Foreign Direct Investment vs. Equity
Investment. Witness the trend towards higher levels of foreign investment as well as
medium to high level of risky assets such as equity.
Table 1: Characteristics of the World’s largest SWFs.
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Regarding the level of investment activity of SWFs, Figure 2 shows that since
2004, there has been a particularly sharp increase in the activity of SWFs, both in terms
of the number of deals consummated and their dollar amount. Amongst the factors behind
this trend have been the recent commodity price boom as well as vast increases in foreign
reserve assets of China and other East Asian countries due to boom in export earnings. Of
course, during 2007, some of these deals were also motivated by an infusion of capital in
distressed U. S. and European financial institutions.
Table 2 below shows the relative importance of Middle Eastern SWFs which are shown
to comprise between 39-46% of the total world-wide SWF assets. In addition, as evident
from the Figure 3 which follows and some of the largest such funds belong to the Middle
Eastern Oil Producers.
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Finally, in order to gain an appreciation of the relative importance of SWFs in
relation to other asset classes, note that while SWFs have been growing in size lately,
they still are a rather modest asset class compared to private–managed assets and foreign
exchange reserves (see Figure 4 and Figure 5). However, the trend is changing and it is
expected that in the near future, there will be significant inroads made by SWFs at the
expense of these other asset classes, particularly the foreign exchange reserve asset class.
Figure 4: SWFs in comparison with other asset classes distributed by major players.
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Figure 5: SWFs in comparison with other asset classes
4.0 A Brief Anatomy of the Subprime Crisis.
Even though the SWF phenomenon under scrutiny is related to the current
(‘Subprime’) crisis, the primary purpose of this paper is not to enumerate the various
factors that have lead up to this financial crisis. Thus, here I would limit myself to
presenting a rather brief anatomy of the crisis. Also, by this time, the causes of this crisis
are generally well known or at least have been researched sufficiently. (For representative
studies, consider Shabbir (2008), Dodd et al (2008)).
4.1 Brief Background:
The trigger of this financial crisis in the U. S. with its attendant significant
negative impact on its real sector and now evident global spillover or contagion effect
was the subprime mortgage crisis which precipitated in the mid-2007. As is abundantly
well-known by this time, these subprime mortgage loans were generally provided to the
relatively less creditworthy clients, had extremely high ‘loan to value’ ratios and typically
little or no documentation was required by the lender; in fact, due to these features such
loans often got dubbed as NINJA loans i.e. loans to applicants who have No Income, No
Job and No Assets! In addition to all the afore-mentioned features, these loans often
carried artificially low ‘teaser’ rates which were to reset in one to three years into the loan
period implying a relatively high credit risk embedded in these mortgages.
As of 2007, the subprime loans comprised $ 1 trillion out of the $ 14 trillion U. S.
total mortgages outstanding – decidedly a small proportion. Again, those subprime loans
originating during 2006 and early 2007 represented only a fraction of the $ 1 trillion
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worth of outstanding loans. Thus even with rapid increase in delinquency rates in late
2006 and early 2007, the total losses were expected to be ‘only’ in the $ 100-200 billion
range – an order of magnitude which, prima facie, should not have been expected to
cause the impact that we are presently experiencing. The important puzzle concerning the
present crisis is that though these subprime loans constituted a relatively small proportion
of the total mortgage market and the magnitude of the losses were to be no worse than the
ones U. S. economy absorbs routinely, they have ended up being the immediate impetus
for the credit crunch1. This has surprised many an observer since the much heralded
recent financial innovation of 'securitization’ was supposed to have diffused the
embedded risk, albeit elevated, of these as well as the Alt-prime and prime mortgages.
The derivative securities in the form of Mortgage Backed Securities (MBS) and, closely
related, Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDO) were meant to be innovations which were
to allow the risk of such underwriting to be carried away from the originating financial
institutions to a broader class of willing investors whose actions would also replenish the
liquidity for the originating financial institution to resume mortgage lending. The MBS
and CDO had grown immensely in the last few years. In fact, certainly before the
outbreak of the current crisis, the above move away from the traditional ‘originate-and-
hold’ banking model to ‘originate-and-distribute’ mortgage origination model was almost
unequivocally heralded as one of the most important factors responsible for the growth of
home ownership in the U. S. in the past few years since 2000-2001.
When the subprime mortgage crisis first started to emerge in mid- 2007, the
dominant opinion was that it will not be a significant event which of course turned out
not to be the case2. However, “Any of the myriad problems in the U. S. mortgage market
could have been contained, but together they caused a crisis that spread across the globe”.
(Dodd et al. 2008).
4.2 The primary causes of the ‘Subprime’ crisis:
(1) The important result is that that otherwise positive financial innovation of
‘securitization’ (MBS and CDO) proved to be ‘faulty’ since it failed to work properly
with the existing structure of financial institutions. In addition, ‘lending exuberance’
manifesting itself in lax underwriting standards at a time when real estate boom was
waning in 2006, deficiencies in assessments of rating agencies (as well as ‘over reliance’
of investors on these assessments to the exclusion of other due diligence measures) and
evident regulatory failures led to the present credit crunch by impairing the value of MBS
and CDO to an uncertain degree. This uncertainty created serious practical difficulties.
The various financial institutions holding these securities were faced with illiquid
markets and rapidly falling market values of their assets and as a result they started
deleveraging to conserve capital (See Leijonhufvud 2008; Also, Shabbir 2008 has a
1 For perspective, the U. S. economy routinely absorbs stock market gains or losses in the 1% volatility
range per day which compare well with the magnitude of losses expected from the subprime loans
gradually over the next few years.
2 Even Fed chairman, Bernanke, remarked in May 17, 2007, “All that said, given the fundamental factors in
place that should support the demand for housing, we believe the effect of the troubles in the subprime
sector on the broader housing market will likely be limited, and we do not expect significant spillovers
from the subprime market to the rest of the economy or to the financial system.”
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representative model of how financial institutions were forced into deleveraging).This
lead to a credit squeeze with its severely negative repercussions on the real economy. In
fact, a major such emergent lesson is that financial innovations should come with a
warning label, ‘handle with care’.
(2) Besides the afore-mentioned behavioral mechanism related to IBs and
applicable to brokers and securities firms in general, the other main channel of contagion
was the ‘crisis of confidence’ unleashed by the revelation that the MBS may have been
mis-priced by an indeterminate extent on account of inaccurate rating assessments3,
transaction opaqueness and outright fraud and malfeasance4.
(3) There were second order effects of the ‘crisis of confidence’ in conjunction
with impaired subprime mortgage backed securities held by the mono line insurance
firms (e.g. MBIA) causing a crunch in municipal bond market and adverse ripple effects
on ‘auction rate securities’, precipitating a credit crunch in the student loan market.
(4) There is also evident regulatory failures when we look at the broader aspects
of contagion of this crisis in the U. S. from it epicenter of subprime mortgage
underwriting deficiencies, delinquencies and defaults. We are now learning that we did
not fully comprehend how well the securitization-inspired MBS and CDOs will work
with the existing regulatory framework and institutional set up. In addition, despite our
limited reforms in the face of bitter experience with the opaqueness of off balance sheet
entities during Enron and WorldCom debacles, we still have much work to do to keep a
better track of these contingent net liabilities.
(5) In addition, the news of the anticipation of ‘decoupling’ of the U.S. and the
rest of the world economies proved to be not so true after all since the recessionary
malaise in the U. S. has, in fact, spread to the rest of the world.
5.0 SWFs and their role in the current global financial crisis.
In this section; I plan to discuss the role SWFs as a potential source of stability in
the face of a financial crisis. There are, however, two points that need to be addressed
prior to engaging in the above exercise.
Firstly, as it turns out in the case of the Subprime Crisis of 2007, the SWF
injections of capital (via purchase of financial assets) in the distressed financial institution
followed the outbreak of the crisis and few investments predated the crisis. That may not
be the case in a future similar crisis when the SWFs will, in all probability, be not in the
relatively enviable position of having been ‘above the fray’. In other words, a future
crisis may very well find SWFs themselves to be ‘victims’ of the crisis and not potential
‘rescuers’, per se; at least, not in as pure a sense as in the case of the present crisis. In
3 Fender, Tarashev, and Zhu, H. 2008 make an interesting observation that reliance on ratings as a measure
of quality may be an inadequate measure in case of CDOs even when it may be sufficient for the case of
corporate bonds.
4 Kelly, 2007 for a sector by sector timeline leading up to the ‘crisis of confidence’.
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fact, SWFs who injected capital in early to mid 2008 in some of the US- distressed
financial institutions, for example, have already had a taste of this as the continued
widening and deepening of the crisis has meant heavy losses for these SWFs which have
turned them relatively more cautious.
Secondly, in the following discussion of the role of SWFs in this section, the
Middle Eastern SWFs are not often singled out and the whole sleuth of worldwide SWFs
is considered. This is done partly to provide a wider perspective to the analysis and
partly on account of statistical convenience. However, wherever feasible, specific
comments about Middle Eastern SWFs may be offered to sharpen the link of discussion
to the formal title of this paper.
5.1 Nature of Investments made by SWFs during Subprime Crisis (2007-2008)
As can be seen from Table 3, during 2007-2008 Q 1, the SWFs from Asia as well
as the Middle East made financial investments in a wide array of mostly American and
European companies. These investments were typically made by purchasing convertible
bonds which carried no voting privileges. Majority of these companies were financial
institutions which needed urgent infusion of capital on account of the subprime CDO
related losses.
Judging by the investments made by SWFs in distressed financial institutions
globally during 2007 through 2008:Q1, they were evidently a significant and a stabilizing
force during this initial phase of the subprime crisis.
The significance of these injections can be judged by noting that between
November 2007 and 2008: Q 1, about $41 billion (or almost 40%) of the total of $105
billion capital injected into major capital-starved financial institutions was contributed by
SWFs. Also, these infusions of capital came at a time of pessimism and extreme risk
avoidance in these markets. As noted by Moshirian (2008), the SWFs purchased these
stakes in these global banks when their credit default swap spread were at historically
high levels and their stock prices at particularly low levels. Thus evidently this capital
infusion allowed the banks to continue their operation. Also, as suggested by Table 4, in
many instances, these capital injections resulted in higher share prices as well as a
reduction in CDS spreads. Even though, as we well know, the subprime crisis has
continued on and progressed to a full-blown financial crisis and an official recession in
the U. S. and the longer run outcome for these institutions continues to be precarious, the
situation would have been much worse but for the capital infusions provided by these






5.2 Implications of SWFs for Financial Stability
5.2.1 Global Financial Stability
An assessment of the implications of SWFs for global financial stability should
involve an evaluation of three interrelated characteristics of SWFs as a : (a) potential
source of capital infusions, (b) provider of liquidity for the long-run and as a (c) correlate
of systemic risk.
Firstly, as noted earlier, the attraction of SWFs as a potential source of capital
infusion into capital-starved financial institutions trapped in a vortex of de-leveraging in
the face of depreciating market value of assets has been evident. Even though, as the
subprime crisis continued to worsen, we have witnessed a fair degree of retrenchment on
the part of these SWFs, the significant infusions by these funds to improve capital base of
the various important financial institutions in the earlier phases of the subprime crisis was
unequivocally a positive development. However, there are some practical difficulties,
including those of a political nature that have presented themselves as obstacles.
Whether the full potential of SWFs as agents of financial stability will be realized will
depend on a successful resolution of these obstacles.
Secondly, since by all accounts, SWF investment horizon appears to be a
relatively longer run one--- thus the global financial system will be spared the ‘sudden
stop’ vulnerabilities due to “hot” money flows; instead, these relatively patient money
flows will be comparatively stabilizing. (Jen 2007). Also, by increasing liquidity
globally, SWFs are expected, on net, to create an environment favorable to enhanced
market efficiency. (Devlen et al. 2007) However, it may also be noted that by favoring
investments in riskier assets for the long run, SWFs investments tend to promote risk-
taking and thus yield a bias favorable to equities vs. bonds.
Thirdly, in terms of the implications of SWF investment flows for systemic risk—
the picture is not that clear-cut. Intuitively, one would expect that SWFs (at least in their
present forms) will be less prone to be highly leveraged, or subject to “herd” behavior;
however, at present we know little about the operative objective function of all these
different types of SWFs. For one thing, in the face of a future crisis, if the SWFs are
relatively heavily vested in the various asset markets and they suffer along with the
market, these funds will be naturally far less willing and able to act as rescuers and thus
be more a part of the problem, rather than part of a solution. Still, as long as the ‘core
funding base’ of a SWF is stable (and not overly cyclical or leveraged too much) they are
potential pro-stability agents, especially when we also consider that these funds are not
typically subject to capital adequacy requirements, though some international prudential
‘codes of conduct’ provision seem imminent and/or inevitable. However, such changes, if
undertaken appropriately, may in fact enhance the net effectiveness of SWFs in terms of
promoting financial stability.
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5.2.2 Impact on asset prices and/or exchange rates
Theoretically, shifts in asset allocations by relatively large SWFs can have
significant and sudden impact on the relative prices of those assets, and if those asset
classes are expressed in different currencies, there can be spillover effects on exchange
rates as well. However, these dire scenarios may not unfold in reality since it is often in
the interest of these relatively large institutional buyers/sellers to pace their purchases/
sales to protect their own interest. Again, there are already institutional investors in
various markets which are comparable in size to these SWFs and market regulators have
experience dealing with this issue; for instance, through proscribing caps, effective
monitoring, or outright safety triggers to halt trades. However, in the case of SWFs, an
additional fear is expressed that some of them may be motivated by non-commercial or
political objectives in sale/purchase of certain securities or assets. However, this can be
effectively monitored, and if need be, at the margin, some additional norms or codes of
conduct can be introduced. In any case, the present experience is reassuring as we
observe that typically SWF portfolios are professionally managed with ‘reputational
capital’ on the line.
5.2.3 Impact from the various Potential Feedback Mechanisms.
The SWF investment flows and stocks of funds are not immune to business cycle
fluctuations, commodity cycles, geo-political risks, and technological shocks, which may
drastically reduce the demand for certain traditional resources such as oil or other
commodities from whose revenue these funds get replenished. Also, the exposure of
these funds will be proportionately greater to a financial crisis itself to the extent that
these SWFs were vested in those asset classes whose value may be seriously adversely
affected by the crisis. Again, in the case of non-commodity funds, such as China CIC the
exchange rate changes may also have a feedback impact if the country by itself, or under
global pressure, decide to reform the exchange rate regime. Thus a revaluation of the
Chinese currency would ceteris paribus reduce the country’s current account surplus and
thus erode some of the funding base of the country’s Sovereign Wealth Fund.
5.2.4 Home Country Benefits due to a SWF
SWFs can enhance the fiscal health of a resource based country by providing a
buffer against volatility of commodity price and revenue stream. One can argue for
several other pro-economic development aspects of an SWF. However, often times there
is a concern expressed, at least implicitly, that if the country has a non-democratic
political institutional setup, SWF can be responsible for perpetuating such a setup.
Even in the case of the non-commodity funds, there is a danger to domestic
financial stability due to the outflow of capital if the SWF comes about as a result of
creating counter party liabilities on the part of the private sector including the private
sector commercial banking system (Park 2008). As described in Park (2008), in the
context of the East Asian Economies and their SWFs, an external shock may impair the
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assets of the SWF and will make the domestic financial system vulnerable to a financial
crisis. However, a pure commodity or resource funded SWF is relatively immune to at
least this sort of a shock.
5.2.5 Concerns expressed about SWFs
(i) SWFs may have ‘hidden’ goals which are non-commercial in nature. They may (in the
fashion of a ‘Trojan Horse’) be looking to gain access to ‘know how’ and technology
about patents and so on in the ‘national security and defense’ related industries. Also,
they may be looking for ‘political’ investments that create potentially debilitating
dependence in critical sectors of the economy such as oil and energy.
(ii) Certain SWFs may be too secretive and lack transparency or otherwise not adhere to
an appropriate “code of conduct”.
(iii) Certain countries with institutions which are weak and/or undemocratic may not be
that ‘desirable’ business partners and thus by extension their SWFs will be so too.
In any event, the following Figures show a simple scatter of a SWF Transparency
Measures with the scores on Legal Institutions and Democratic Institutions respectively –
note a positive correlation between the ‘Transparency Score’ and the Quality of Legal
System Score as well as ‘Democracy Accountability’.
Figure 6: SWF Transparency Score vs. Legal System Score
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Figure 7: SWF Transparency Score vs. Democracy Accountability.
Though we will not discuss these in any detail, we want to note that IMF as well
as the OECD is working on a set of principles which may represent a ‘code of conduct’
for the home and the host countries respectively. (Moshirian 2008).
6.0 Concluding Remarks
1) The phenomenon of the SWFs is truly a remarkable one. These funds are expected to
occupy center stage in future discussions of global capital flows, financial stability, issues
of governance, corporate central and transparency as well as the emerging remake of the
international financial structure.
2) In the current crisis it is relatively easy to make a case for SWFs acting in the capacity
of ‘rescuers’ and a potential source of capital infusion. However, this may not be the
case in the aftermath of a future similar crisis if these SWFs happen to be vested in the
same risky assets which may cause the deleveraging cascade for the other financial
institutions in the first place.
3) One can view these funds to have a quantity as well as a quality dimension and the
latter could very well be in the eye of the beholder. Discussions of whether these SWFs
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are a “friend or a foe” are expected to continue. It is expected that eventually there will be
eventually a “pecking order” both for recipient countries as well as home countries in
terms of the preferred sources and destinations for such funds.
4) Concerns about sources, composition, investment strategies and end use of these SWFs
would be important topics for ongoing research and discourse.
5) These SWFs will have far reaching effects on markets for risky assets as well as for
the U. S. Treasuries. In time, development in commodity markets and Exchange Rate
Regimes, along with the national income and budged deficit of the United States and
European countries, will impact the funding base of these SWFs.
6) Expect evolution of a new monitoring and regulatory framework which may
introduce important innovations in terms of “codes of conduct” for these funds and once
such a discussion opens up; a similar code may also come about for hedge funds and
other private equity funds.
7) These SWFs will have differential regional as well as global effect on countries
ranging from the Developed Economies to the Developing ones.
8) The most critical question will be in terms of the effect of SWFs on financial stability
in a tri-partite fashion -- at home, for host countries, and finally, in a global systemic
sense. The still unfolding global crisis will provide a sort of a benchmark or a baseline
scenario regarding the role of the SWFs. Future dynamics of global financial architecture
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